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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Brie{ Statement of the Case 
Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. ("AEHI") is the recipient of certain land-use approvals 
before Payette County (the "County"), including applications for rezone, conceptual plan, and a 
development agreement (collectively, the "Application·'). 
This appeal should be dismissed and the County's approval of the Application should be 
upheld for the following reasons: First, the Payette County Comprehensive Plan (May 2006) (the 
"Comprehensive Plan") contains each of the planning elements required by Idaho Code Section 
67-6508 and is valid. Second, the County's approval of the Application is in accordance with the 
Comprehensive Plan and does not constitute illegal "spot zoning." And, third, the County met 
and exceeded each of its notice requirements at every step of its proceedings. Even if H-Hook 
LLC ("H-Hook") were correct with regard to its notice argument, there is no violation of H-
Hook' s substantial rights. 
Course of Proceedings and Procedural Issues 
AEHI and the County largely agree with the Course of Proceedings as identified by H-
Hook, with the exception of Footnote 2, which contains nothing more than H-Hook's own 
unsubstantiated supposition that is neither relevant nor part of the record before this Court. 
One other item deserves comment: Although the caption of this case would suggest 
otherwise, Note 1 of the Appellant's Brief and H-Hook's statement on Page 3 of the Appellant's 
Brief ("H-Hook has appealed from portions of that Order") indicate that only H-Hook is 
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appealing the decision the District Court. Therefore, only H-Hook is deemed for purposes of 
this appeal as an appellant, and the caption of this Respondent and Intervenor's Brie/is 
structured accordingly. 
Statemem of Facts 
AEHI has been involved in a long and very public application process \Vith the County, 
which is the first step in AEHI' s goal of constructing a nuclear power production facility. The 
County's approval of the Application allows AEHI to continue the regulatory process 1 for the 
project on 500 acres (the "Property") of a larger, approximately 5,000-acre parcel of which 
AEHI is the contract-purchaser. Agency Record (Ag. R.) p. 11. The area near the Property 
includes non-prime agriculture ground, four confined animal feeding operations (within five 
miles of the Property), and Clay Peak Landfill (approximately three miles northwest of the 
Property). The nearest residence is over three miles from the Property. Ag. R. p. 4156. 
Prior to making its Application to the County, AEHI conducted extensive studies of both 
the physical features of the Property and the project's potential land use impacts on the area, 
including the area economy. The physical features of the Property and its capacity to support 
this use were described in a detailed report prepared by ENERCON Services, Inc., a national 
engineering, environmental, technical, and management firm with expertise in the nuclear arena, 
including the federal licensing process. Ag. R. p. 22; 222-625; 1120-27. The ENERCON study 
concluded that this Property is an appropriate location for the proposed use. An economic, tax 
1 Once local government land use decisions have been addressed, AEHI plans to engage in an extended application 
process before federal regulatory agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, during which operational 
and safety elements of AEHI's proposal will be scrutinized. See 10 C.F.R. 52; Ag. R p. 22-23; Dec. 2, 2010 Tr. p. 
23-29. 
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revenue, and public-service impact study \Vas prepared by Johnson Reid, a consultant firm 
specializing in real estate development and land-use economics. Ag. R. p. 38; 653-84. The 
Johnson Reid study showed significant economic benefits for the County and the State of Idaho. 
Ag. R. p. 39. While these studies were being conducted, AEHI met with numerous local 
governments, officials, and businesses in order to solicit public comment. Ag. R. p. 63-64. Such 
comments were incorporated into AEHI' s Application materials, which included discussion and 
studies related to land use issues such as: water issues and availability (Ag. R. p. 51;710-72); 
school facilities (Ag. R. p. 54-58; 685-709); and area roadways (Ag. R. p. 59-60; 647-652). 
Before submitting the Application, AEHI requested the Payette County Board of County 
Commissioners (the "Board") to approve an amendment to the County's comprehensive plan. 
This amendment designated the Property for industrial uses and was approved by the Board on 
June 21, 2010. Ag. R. p. 93-160; 3822-81; 3883-90. With that public hearing process complete, 
AEHI submitted the Application2 on June 22, 2010. Ag. R. p. 1. The Application was accepted 
and deemed complete by the County on July 13, 2010. Ag. R. p. 1176. 
The County went to great lengths to ensure the public was able to review the Application. 
The Application was available for public review at the Planning & Zoning Office beginning in 
June 2010-six months before hearings the Planning & Zoning Commission (the 
"Commission") hearings in December 2010 and one year before the Board hearings in June 
2 The Application included a request to the County for a variance from a height limitation established under Payette 
County Code ("PCC"). The County approved the variance request; however, the District Court entered an order 
vacating the variance for a number of reasons. That decision has not been appealed and is not before this Court. 
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2011. Hard copies and compact discs were available at cost and the County posted the 
Application and public testimony online for public download-free of charge. Ag. R. p. 3518. 
The County began its review of the Application by convening its Technical Review 
Committee (the "Committee'').1 The Committee conducted numerous public meetings "to 
ensure a fair and neutral report. .. for use and review by the ... Commission and the Board." Ag. 
R. p. 1236. Each meeting was noticed and each was held at the County engineer's offices 
between August and October 2010. Ag. R. p. 1174-1235, 1241 1243, 1336-1341. Thirty-five 
city, county, state, and federal governmental agencies and public service providers were notified 
of the meetings and were asked to provide comments and/or attend. Ag. R. p. 1244-1245. The 
meetings were open to the public. Organizations attending included the Snake River Alliance 
and Advocates for the West. Ag. R. p. 1201, 1209, 1228, 1242. 
The County engineer presented a report of the Committee's findings at the Commission's 
first public hearing on December 2, 2010.Dec.2, 2010 Tr. p. 81-88. At a subsequent hearing, 
held on December 10, 2010, the Commission voted to recommend approval of the Application to 
the Board per Payette County Code Sections 8-11-8 and 8-5-11, Ag. R. p. 3378-3464. 
A group of appellants-including many of H-Hook's co-petitioners before the District 
court (referred to herein as the "Petitioners")-appealed the recommendation to the Board. 
Petitioners submitted, through attorney and Petitioner James Underwood, forty-one pages of 
3 Payette County Code establishes a "Technical Review Committee" to review an application from the viewpoint of 
the technical disciplines represented on the Committee. PCC § 8-5-14.C. I. The Technical Review Committee is 
made up of the county engineer, the planning and zoning staff, the applicant, the applicant's engineer, the affected 
road department, a city in whose impact area the property may be located, an affected irrigation company, fire 
district, utility companies, school district, any affected state or federal agency and any other person requested by the 
committee, the commission or the board." PCC § 8-5-14.A. 
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argument in an appeal filing (Ag. R. p. 3467-3482), an appeal brief (Ag. R. p. 3486-351 and a 
reply brief submitted after oral argument. Ag. R. p. 3536-3540.4 Although the Board determined 
at hearing on February 22, 2011 that Petitioners' appeal of the recommendation to approve the 
Application \Vas unripe (Ag. R. p. 3547), each of these items were included in the record before 
the Board and the District Court 
The Commission's recommendation was eventually heard by the Board on June 6, 2011. 
Ag. R. p. 3998-4021. After the required written notices were published (Ag. R. p. 4081-83), 
written public comment flooded in, much of it in support of the project. See, e.g., Ag. R. p. 3555-
3560, 3564, 3611-18, 3619-54, 3657-59, and 3910. H-Hook provided written testimony directly 
(see, e.g., Ag. R. p. 3911-12 (Michael Humphreys/H Hook)) and through its attorney who 
provided "Comments and Objections" with hundreds of pages of exhibits. Ag. R. p. 3660-3908. 
The June 6, 2011 hearing took place at the Payette High School Auditorium and was 
attended by dozens of members of the public. Ag. R. p. 3998-99. The hearing lasted for several 
hours and included testimony from AEHI and its consultants discussing a number of topics, 
including site feasibility (Ag. R. p. 4000), transmission-line issues and reactor design (id.), water 
needs and availability (Ag. R. p. 4001-02), and impacts on area roadways (Ag. R. p. 4003). The 
County engineer, who had visited three different nuclear power plants (including Ft. Calhoun 
Nuclear (Washington County, Nebraska); Cooper Nuclear (Nemaha County, Nebraska); and 
Wolf Creek Nuclear (Coffee County, Kansas)), provided a substantive and detailed report of his 
4 New factual evidence was submitted by Mr. Underwood and considered by the Board. See, e.g., Ag. R. p. 3505-
3512. This was in addition to several letters submitted by Mr. Underwood on behalf of these appellants both before 
and after the appeal hearing in front of the Board. See Ag. R. p. 3483, 3485, 3535, 3543-3545. Mr. Underwood 
testified on behalf of these appellants at the Board's hearing on February 22, 2011. Ag. R. p. 3530-3532. 
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findings regarding each plant and their land use effects on their respective communities. Ag. R. 
p. 4143-44. Members of the public were each given five minutes (rather than the minimum of 
three minutes set by PCC § 1-7-2.D) in which to provide their verbal comments (Ag. R. p. 3999) 
and the majority testified in favor of the Application. Ag. R. p. 4007-18. In response to a topic 
that was prominently in the news at that time and the subject of many public comments, and with 
the permission of the Board prior to the close of the hearing (Ag. R. p. 4018), one of AEHI' s 
consultants provided the Board with an overview of the Fukushima Daiichi March 11, 2011 
nuclear event and provided comparisons to the proposal by AEHI. Ag. R. p. 3972-95; 4018-21. 
The hearing was closed at 10:34 p.m. on June 6, 2011. It was announced at that time that 
a decision would be made on June 20, 2011. Ag. R. p. 4021. At public hearing on June 20, 2011, 
each Board member deliberated on the record and the Board moved unanimously to approve the 
Application. Ag. R. p. 4026. The written decision approving the Application was signed on 
August 29, 2011. Ag. R. p. 4160. The Development Agreement was recorded that same day. Ag. 
R. p. 4098. 
II. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Per I.AR. 35(b )(5), the County and AEHI hereby set forth as an additional issue 
presented on appeal a claim for attorneys' fees and costs in the event the Court dismisses H-
Hook's claims. The claim for attorneys' fees and costs is pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117 
and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. As will be more fully set forth below, H-Hook's 
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arguments and appeals are without a reasonable basis in fact or law and, therefore, satisfy the 
standard set forth in Idaho Code Section 12-11 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ST AND ARD OF REVIE\V 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (I.C. § 67-6501, et seq.) ("LLUPA'") permits judicial 
review of certain land use applications in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures 
Act ("IDAPA"). Cm-van v. Board ofCom'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 
1247, 1254 (2006). "For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, a local agency 
making a land use decision is treated as a government agency under IDAPA."' Id. (citing Urrutia 
v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000)). IDAPA states that the district 
court "shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: violate constitutional or statutory provisions; exceed statutory 
authority; are made upon unlawful procedure; are not supported by substantial evidence on the 
record as a whole; or are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." I.C. § 67-5279(3) 
( emphasis added). Further, even if there is such a violation, "agency action shall be affirmed 
unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." J.C.§ 67-5279(4) (emphasis 
added). 
It is the appellant's burden "to first illustrate how the board erred in a manner specified 
under Idaho Code Section 67-5279, and then establish that a substantial right has been 
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prejudiced. Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 424,431, 210 P.3d 539 
(2009) (citing Druffel v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 855, 41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002)). 
In considering a petition for judicial review, .. [ t ]he court shall not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. I.C. § 67-5279(1). 
There is a strong presumption in favor not only of a zoning board's actions, but also that a 
zoning board has interpreted its own zoning ordinances correctly. Hawkins v. Bonneville County 
Bel. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho228,23L254P.3d 1224. 1227(20Il)(citingSandersOrchardv. Gem 
Crity. ex rel. Bel. of Cnty. Comm 'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002)). See also 
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508; Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rel. Bd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 197, 
207 P.3d 169, 173 (2009); Hmvard v. Canyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 479,480,915 
P.2d 709, 710 (1996). 
B. THE ADOPTED COMPREHENSIVE PLAN SATISFIES THE COUNTY'S 
OBLIGATIONS AND IS VALID UNDER IDAHO LAW 
H-Hook argues that the County's approval of the Application is void because, in its 
judgment, the Comprehensive Plan is invalid. H-Hook's argument is without merit as it calls for 
comprehensive planning requirements that exceed the established parameters set forth in Idaho 
Code and in case law.5 
5 The County and AEHI note that H-Hook's argument is that the rezone is invalid is, at its core, a challenge to the 
validity of the Comprehensive Plan, as amended. The context for this challenge is a petition for judicial review. 
While a challenge to a comprehensive plan was considered in the context of a rezone approval in Sprenger, Grubb 
& Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343, this Court subsequently determined in cases 
including Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008), Burns Holdings, LLC v. 
Madison County Bd. of County Com'rs, 147 Idaho 660,214 P.3d 646 (2008), Taylorv. Canyon County Bd. of 
Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 424,210 P.3d 532 (2009) that there was no statute authorizing a petition for judicial review of a 
decision to amend a comprehensive plan map. The County and AEHI therefore question whether there is 
jurisdiction for this Court to consider what is in actuality a challenge to the Comprehensive Plan. 
RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF · 12 
1. Standards for a Valid Comprehensive Plan 
Idaho Code requires every city and county (LC. § 67-6503) to "prepare, implement, and 
review and update" its comprehensive plan considering sixteen separate planning components 
"as they may apply to land use regulations and actions." LC. § 67-6508 (emphasis added). 6 
Within each planning component, the comprehensive plan is to consider: "previous and existing 
conditions, trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future 
situations." LC. § 67-6508 ( emphasis added). Use of the word "or" makes the Legislature's 
intent clear that not all of these items must be addressed. 
Regarding the one planning component that addresses ''public services, facilities, and 
utilities," the County is to provide an "analysis showing general plans for ... power plant sites, 
utility transmission corridors ... and related services." LC. § 67-6508(h) (emphasis added). As 
the District Court correctly held below, use of the word "general" reflects the Legislature's intent 
that a local government not get caught up into micro-managing these elements; instead, given the 
plain meaning of the word "general," the plan should be "concerned with main elements rather 
than limited details." MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, "General," available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/e:eneral (last accessed April 7, 2014). 
Case law establishes two important instructions in interpreting whether a comprehensive 
plan is valid. First, a plan must address each statutorily required component; otherwise, the plan 
may be struck. Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 
343 (1999). So long as each component is addressed, however, Idaho courts have consistently 
6 If any of the sixteen planning components do not apply within any particular jurisdiction, the local government 
may simply specify "reasons why a particular component is unneeded." I.C. § 67-6508. 
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recognized comprehensive plans as legislative action, meaning there is a "great deference 
given ... [ due to its] high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate remedy 
can be had at the polls." Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407, 
410, 614 P.2d 947, 950 (1980). See also Gay v. County Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 103 
Idaho 626, 628, 651 P.2d 560, 562 (1982) ("This restrained standard of review is appropriate to 
such legislative determinations as the adoption of comprehensive plans .... "). 
As illustrated below, the County addressed the statutorily required components in its 
Comprehensive Plan. The County should be given the deference that it is due. 
2. The County Addressed Each Statutorily Mandated Component in its 
Comprehensive Plan 
H-Hook first raised the issue of the validity of the Comprehensive Plan over three years 
ago at hearings before the County in connection with the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan 
that was adopted by the County before the Application was ever submitted. Appellant's Brief, at 
16. The County properly rejected H-Hook's claims at that time and no appeal was filed. 
This recycled argument attacks a legislative decision by the County that was the result of 
considerable effort and expense. The Comprehensive Plan came only after an extensive hearing 
process that commenced in 2004. An advisory committee and four citizen working groups, 
including a representative from Idaho Power, Keith Kolar (Ag. R. p. 4272), met repeatedly 
throughout the process. Planning policy questions with regard to "Public Services, Facilities, 
and Utilities" were considered at length. Ag. R. p. 4225-4239. 
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It is important to recall that the Comprehensive Plan has a ten-year planning horizon. 
Ag. R. p. 4175. The Comprehensive Plan addresses each of the statutorily mandated components 
within that window. With regard to "public services, facilities, and utilities, the Comprehensive 
Plan discusses previous and existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, and 
desirable future situations, exceeding Idaho Code Section 67-6508's requirement to discuss just 
one of these items. The County discusses previous and existing conditions in Comprehensive 
Plan Section 9.2.7.1., which describes electrical providers, generation facilities, and electrical 
rates. Ag. R. p. 4234. Trends for the next ten years are discussed in Section 9.3, with the County 
concluding that Idaho Power Company will continue to offer electrical service "to all developed 
portions of the county, as needed" and that consumption of electricity is actually "declining due 
to enhanced technological efficiency in transmission and distribution." Ag. R. p. 4236. The 
Comprehensive Plan also discusses desirable future situations, with the County concluding that 
the current provider is in a position to continue to provide adequate service during the current 
planning window; one area that may require improvement is in Sand Hollow. Ag. R. p. 4237. 
With regard to power plant sites, the County is not a public utilities commission and 
LLUPA is not a facilities-siting statute. This fact is recognized in LLUPA, which requires the 
County to come up with only a "general" plan for power plant sites. With this in mind, the 
Comprehensive Plan states that "Electric Power is available to all county residents through Idaho 
Power Company. Electricity is generated by hydroelectric facilities located at Brownlee, 
Oxbow, and Hells Canyon dams on the Snake River, adjacent to Washington County." Ag. R. p. 
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4234. Electric pmver may also be provided by the Idaho Power Company-owned Langley Gulch 
plant recently approved by the County. Id. 
Given the fact that the County is only required to come up with a "general" plan for 
pmver plant sites in the County, and given the fact that the County concluded that the current 
facilities are adequate during the Comprehensive Plan's ten-year planning window, the 
Comprehensive Plan fully satisfies Idaho Code's planning requirements. 
3. H-Hook's Argument Misstates the Content of the Comprehensive Plan 
In disregard of the above, H-Hook claims that "fnJo consideration in the County's 
comprehensive plan was given to trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and 
objectives, or desirable future situations concerning power plant siting or utility transmission 
corridors. The matter was simply unaddressed." Appellant's Brief; at 15-16. On its face, this is a 
misportrayal of the record before this Court. As illustrated above, the County actually went 
above and beyond its duty, addressing each of the items identified in Idaho Code Section 67-
6508(h) when only one would have sufficed. H-Hook's claim that the Comprehensive Plan is 
missing "a statutorily required element" (Appellant's Brief; at 19) is mere wishful thinking. 
Nothing in Idaho Code or case law requires the County to micromanage the plans of 
sophisticated electrical utilities by designating specific power plant sites within the County. 
LLUPA calls for general planning by the local government. Even if the County's analysis was 
unreasonable (it clearly was not), the County's approach to compiling its Comprehensive Plan is 
legislative action entitled to "great deference" ( Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410) and should be upheld. 
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4. The Comprehensive Plan Amendment Acknowledges that Future Applications 
\Viii Be Considered in Light of the Planning Efforts Already Contained in the 
Comprehensive Plan 
Despite the fact that the Comprehensive Plan satisfies the County's planning duties, the 
County nevertheless agreed to an amendment to Section 9 .2. 7 .1 of the Comprehensive Plan. 
This amendment acknowledges the fact that energy producers-public or private-may approach 
the County with future applications. Such applications will be considered not only based on 
LLUP A and then-existing County code, but also based on the planning efforts contained in "this 
plan." Ag. R. p. 3883. This language does not detract from the County's efforts to address each 
of the statutorily mandated factors in its Comprehensive Plan, including analysis for public 
services, facilities, and utilities. Indeed, the Board stated at the time that they believed the prior 
planning efforts were adequate to meet their responsibilities under Idaho Code. Ag. R. p. 3870. 
Instead, the amendment was an acknowledgement that energy producers-including private 
energy producers-may come to the County and seek to operate at some future date. As would 
be expected, any such application will be considered based on the rules in place at the time such 
an application is submitted. The amendment is simply recognition of this basic fact. 
5. H-Hook Misportrays the District Court's Decision, Which Reiterates the 
County's Limited Planning Obligations Under I.C. § 67-6508 
H-Hook's argument misses the point of Judge Huskey's reasoning. Judge Huskey was 
correct in stating that only a "general" plan is required. Order on Appeal and Order of Remand 
in CVJl-959 (the "Order"), at 33-35 (R. p. 311-313) and the Order's deferential take on the 
County's planning requirements is appropriate. 
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If there is any error in Judge Huskey's decision, it is in her statement that the 
·'Comprehensive Plan, before the amendment, spends two paragraphs identifying what power is 
available to county residents, but does not discuss where in the County, if at all, those power 
plants are located. Order, at 34 (R. p. 312). As noted above, the Comprehensive Plan does 
identify the location of these power plants, v,-hich the County determined vmuld provide 
adequate power during the Comprehensive Plan's ten-year planning window. Ag. R. p. 4234. 
Yet, even if the County had not undertaken the planning efforts described above, the District 
Court was correct in concluding that "address! ing] the requests as the requests are made" 
satisfies the requirement of a "general plan." Order, at 35 (R. p. 313). This standard is sufficient 
to satisfy the limited planning mandate of Idaho Code Section 67-6508. 
C. THE APPROVAL OF THE REZONE IS NOT SPOT ZONING 
H-Hook next argues that the approval of the Application constitutes "spot zoning." As 
shown more fully below, H-Hook's claim is, once again, misplaced. 
1. Idaho Tests for Validity of Alleged Spot Zoning 
Under current Idaho cases, "Type One" spot zoning refers to "[a] rezoning of property for 
a use prohibited by the original zoning classification. The test for whether such a zone 
reclassification is valid is whether the zone change is in accord with the comprehensive plan." 
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76-77, 73 P.3d 84, 89-90 (2003) (emphasis added). 
Meanwhile, "Type two spot zoning refers to a zone change that singles out a parcel of land for 
use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an 
individual property owner." Evans, 139 Idaho at 77. 
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The relationship between Type One and Type Two spot zoning has been the subject of 
recent decisions. In Evans, this Court dismissed a generic spot zoning claim because the 
requested rezone was in compliance with the comprehensive plan. Evans, 139 Idaho at 76-77. 
Taylor v. Canyon County Bd of Com 'rs. 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009) reached the same 
result in the face of a claim of illegal Type Two spot zoning, holding that a court need look no 
further if the rezone is in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Id. at 43 7. 
2. The Proposed Rezone Does Not Constitute Illegal Spot Zoning 
i. The County's Decision on the Application Does Not Constitute Invalid Type One 
Spot Zoning 
The County, as an exercise of is legislative power, has stated in its Comprehensive Plan 
that this area of the County is planned to promote industrial-including heavy industrial-uses. 
The amendment to the Comprehensive Plan confirming this change was complete June 21, 2010. 
Ag. R. p. 93-160; 3822-81; 3883-90. Thereafter, AEHI requested a change in zoning from A 
(Agricultural) to I-2 (heavy industrial). The Application's rezoning request was, therefore, in 
precise conformance with the Comprehensive Plan and, therefore, the Type One spot zoning that 
occurred in this case is valid. See Taylor, 147 Idaho at 424. 
H-Hook counters by arguing, first, that the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan 
designating the Property as industrial "circumvent[s] the prohibitions on spot zoning ... [because 
it] allow[s] the spot zoning to occur." Appellant's Brief, at 26. In order to make its argument, H-
Hook is trotting out a new cause of action alleging that a comprehensive plan may not be 
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amended (what H-Hook calls "spot amended") to allow for future rezones Appellant ·s Brief; 
at 25)-a theory for which H-Hook provides no precedent and no legal support. 
This novel theory flies in the face of the statutory authorization for comprehensive 
planning and zoning. Under LLUPA, local governments are '·to prepare, implement, and review 
and update a comprehensive plan .... '' I.C. § 67-6508 (emphasis added). Any person may 
petition for a comprehensive plan amendment at any time. I.C. § 67-6509(d). Most importantly 
for these purposes, LLUPA specifically states that if a local government finds that a rezone 
request is not in accord with its comprehensive plan, the local government may consider an 
amendment to its comprehensive plan and then, post-plan amendment, consider the rezone 
request. LC. § 67-6511(2)(c). H-Hook's argument contradicts this clear authority. 
Ignoring this statutory authority is the only way H-Hook can argue the rezone was invalid 
Type One spot zoning. Given the fact that the Comprehensive Plan was amended by the County 
to allow industrial use at the Property, and given the fact that the Board's rezone findings that the 
industrial zone is in accord with the Comprehensive Plan, as amended, are supported by 
substantial competent evidence (Ag. R. p. 4159), the Type One spot zoning alleged by H-Hook is 
valid and the rezone should be upheld. See Evans, 139 Idaho at 77. 
ll. The County's Decision on the Application Does Not Constitute Invalid Type Two 
Spot Zoning 
H-Hook next claims that the Application is "undisputedly type two spot zoning" and, 
therefore, must be invalidated. The District Court did not agree. 
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Again. Type Two spot zoning "refers to a zone change that singles out a parcel of land 
for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an 
individual property owner." Evans, 139 Idaho at 77. H-Hook mischaracterizes the record when 
it suggests this use-on 500 acres in a very rural part of the County-is inconsistent with area 
uses. H-Hook may believe that the Property is poorly suited for industrial use (see Appellant's 
Brief, at 4), but the Board, based on substantial and competent evidence, found the opposite: 
The surrounding uses include agriculture, confined animal feeding operations (CAFO), a 
county landfill and residential. The surrounding agricultural property is not deemed 
prime agricultural. Clay Peak Landfill is located approximately three miles northwest of 
the subject property. There are four (4) CAFOs within five miles. In addition, the 
proposed facility is over three miles away from the nearest residence. 
Ag. R. p. 4156. Based upon these findings, the Board concluded that "[t]he zoning proposed is 
compatible with surrounding uses and zones." Id. This finding, of itself, is a sufficient basis for 
this Court to conclude that there was no Type Two spot zoning in this case. 
Meanwhile, the District Court decided, based on analysis set forth in Taylor, that the spot 
zoning claim should be dismissed because "the Board's finding that the rezone is in accordance 
with the Amended Comprehensive Plan is supported by substantial, competent, although 
conflicting, evidence in the record and therefore, must be affirmed." Order, at 36 (R. p. 314). H-
Hook believes this conclusion is in error because it would "make type two spot zoning a nullity" 
(Appellant's Brie_{, at 28); however, H-Hook overstates its case. Even after Taylor and Evans, 
Type One and Type Two spot zoning remain valid descriptors of a zoning action. An approved 
rezone may still fall within either of these categories and could be deemed invalid on either 
basis. Type Two spot zoning still exists-the distinction is that a rezoning action will be upheld 
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over an allegation that it is invalid if the rezone is in conformance with a comprehensive plan-
or, in other words, if the Type One spot zoning alleged is valid. 
This Court's decisions in Evans and Taylor address this point definitively. In Evans, the 
petitioners alleged a rezone was "inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning 
district and violates the Comprehensive Plan." Evans, 139 Idaho at 76. Thus, while no labels 
were applied, it appears both Type One and Type T\vo spot zoning were alleged in that case. 
This made no difference to the Evans Court which dismissed the spot zoning claim in its entirety 
because the rezone was in accordance with the comprehensive plan: "The appellants' claim of 
spot zoning need not be addressed because the type one 'spot zoning' in this case is valid." 
Evans, 139 Idaho at 77. The Taylor petitioners (the Vickers), meanwhile, were very specific 
when they argued ·'that the Board committed an illegal type two spot zoning by singling out 
Savala's property for commercial use in the midst of an agricultural zoning district merely for 
Savala's private gain." Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436. Canyon County argued, in response, that the 
rezone was in compliance with the comprehensive plan "and, therefore ... there is no need to 
address the [petitioners'] claim of type two spot zoning." Id. The Taylor Court agreed with 
Canyon County, concluding the Vickers' "claim of spot zoning need not be addressed since the 
type one spot zoning that occurred in this case is valid." Id. at 437. 
H-Hook's suggestion that the District Court's decision stands "for the proposition that 
there is no type two spot zoning in Idaho" (Appellant's Brief, at 29) ignores these clear holdings 
in Taylor and Evans. Again, Type Two spot zoning may still occur; however, any such rezone 
will be upheld if there is a finding that the rezone is in accordance with a comprehensive plan. 
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H-Hook' s last-ditch spot-zoning argument is that Taylor is distinguishable from the facts 
of this case because, according to H-Hook, only Type One spot zoning occurred in Taylor. This 
read of Taylor is simply wrong. Taylor very clearly included an allegation of Type Two spot 
zoning. In fact, one of the Taylor Court's headings in its decision concluded that "The Board 
did not commit illegal type two spot zoning." Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436 (emphasis as in 
original). The Taylor Court could not have been more explicit when it stated there was "no need 
to address the Vickers' claim of type two spot zoning" once the determination had been made 
that the rezone \Vas in conformance with the comprehensive plan. Id. ( emphasis added). 
There is no distinction between Taylor and these facts. H-Hook's claim to the contrary is 
without merit. 
D. THE NOTICE AND HEARING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE COUNTY 
COMPLIED WITH LLUPA AND THE PAYETTE COUNTY CODE 
H-Hook's final argument on appeal attacks the notice and procedure followed by the 
County. To be clear, Petitioners attacked the County for a wide variety of alleged notice errors 
below; however, H-Hook acknowledges that the District Court rejected each of these claims and 
H-Hook has not appealed any of these findings. 7 
However, H-Hook now claims that the District Court did not resolve one argument: that 
H-Hook did not have adequate opportunity to review the draft Development Agreement. To be 
clear, the District Court concluded in its Order that "there were no Due Process violations in the 
7 It is noted, however, that the Conclusion of the Appellant's Brief (see Page 42) indicates that "the hearing process 
was illegally rendered unfair by several due process violations affecting substantial rights." Given Appellant's 
statement to the contrary on Page 31 of its brief, any appeal based on other alleged "due process violations" beyond 
that specifically asserted in the Appellant's Brief should be deemed waived. 
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manner in which the hearing was conducted and the Petitioners have not established any 
violation of a fundamental right on this basis to establish harm.'' Order, at 63 (R.p. 341). 
Nevertheless, this claim is also \:vi th out merit. Even if there were a notice violation, no 
substantial injury has occurred. 
L Basic Standards in Idaho Law for Notice 
''Procedural due process requires some process to ensure that the individual is not 
arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. This 
requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard." 
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 
(2007) (citing Cowan v. Board ofCom'rs ofFremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 
(2006)). The basic standard in Idaho law is that an affected person must be given ·'notice of the 
type of issues and evidence that [ are J likely to arise at the hearing and the types of evidence they 
may [wish] to present to rebut [an applicant's] claims." Evans v. Board of Coni'rs of Cassia 
County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 428,432, 50 P.3d 443,447 (2002). 
2. H-Hook Participated Fully in the Hearings Before the County 
The County satisfied each of its requirements for providing written and published notice. 
H-Hook does not contest that notices were timely mailed or published and no issue related to 
these notices is on appeal. Nor does H-Hook contest the many additional steps undertaken by 
the County to ensure the public had notice of the type of issues and evidence likely to arise at 
hearing, as noted on pages 5 and 6 above. 
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There is no evidence in the record that H-Hook was caught unaware with the Application. 
The record shows that H-Hook and several of the Petitioners participated in the County's 
comprehensive plan amendment hearings, which concluded in April 2010, and which was the 
precursor to AEHI filing its Application. Ag. R. p. 153-160. H-Hook provided testimony (Ag. R. 
p. 111-112) and participated through its attorney. Ag. R. p. 125-126. 
H-Hook's subsequently participated extensively throughout the proceedings related to the 
Application. H-Hook was one of the named participants in the appeal before the Board in 
February 2011. Ag. R. p. 3468. Through its attorney, James Undenvood, H-Hook submitted, in 
addition to oral argument, forty-one pages of argument in its appeal filing, brief, and reply brief. 
Ag. R. p. 3467-3482: 3486-3512; 3536-3540. Prior to the June 6, 2011 Board hearing, H-Hook 
and the Petitioners gathered thirty-eight pages of petitions (Ag. R. p. 3565-3604 )8 and submitted 
additional letters to the County. See, e.g., Ag. R. p. 3562-63 (James Underwood); 3604-09 (Betty 
and Joseph Bercik); 3610 (Jo Ann Jeffries); 3655-56 (Jeff and Debbie Weber); 3909 (Jo Ann 
Jeffries); and 3911-12 (Michael Humphreys/H Hook). H-Hook's attorney submitted an 
additional twenty-six (26) pages of written legal argument and testimony (Ag. R. p. 3660-86), to 
which was attached several exhibits constituting 221 additional pages. Ag. R. p. 3687-3908. 
This is all in addition to the testimony provided by H-Hook's principal, Michael 
Humphreys, at hearing. This point is critical: Mr. Humphreys spoke at length about the 
development agreement during his testimony. June 6,2011 Tr. p. 98-101. At no point in that 
testimony does Mr. Humphreys claim that he did not have an opportunity to read the proposed 
8 The Board also had before it forty-two pages of petitions in support of the project. Ag. R p. 3923-3965. 
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development agreement in its entirety: to the contrary, Mr. Humphreys offered detailed 
criticisms of the development agreement, including its term and its obligations. Id. Mr. 
Humphreys follmved his verbal testimony with a letter submitted at the hearing that reiterated his 
opinions regarding the form and content of the Development Agreement. Ag. R. 3911-3912. 
Clearly, H-Hook had an opportunity to review the Development Agreement in detail. 
Without question, H-Hook participated meaningfully with an understanding of the types of 
issues and evidence likely to arise at the hearing. Evans, 137 Idaho at 432. 
3. The District Court Was Correct in Concluding There \Vere No Notice Defects in 
the Procedure Followed by the County 
Even after all the effort expended by the County and even in light of its extensive 
participation and direct discussion of the Development Agreement at public hearings, H-Hook 
still construes its notice rights as having been violated. 
Before addressing H-Hook's specific argument, it is important to keep in mind the 
procedure for considering development agreements, which is set by the governing board by 
ordinance. J.C. § 67-651 lA. Payette County Code does not require that a development 
agreement be submitted with an application for rezone. "In the event a development agreement 
is proposed by the developer or the administrator at the time an application is submitted or in the 
event a development agreement is deemed appropriate by the commission during or after a 
public hearing, the reasons for proposing the use of a development agreement shall be forwarded 
to the board ... with the commission's findings and recommendation." PCC § 8-5-11. C ( emphasis 
added). While the Board could have requested a development agreement even if one had not 
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been proposed, there is no requirement in Payette County Code that the development agreement 
be finalized prior to the hearing as a "development agreement may be made a condition of 
approval." Id. § 8-5-11.D (emphasis added). If a condition of approval, then the agreement 
\vould necessarily be finalized per the Board's instruction, post-hearing. 
H-Hook disregards these points and instead implies that no proposed development 
agreement was available for public review until shortly before the public hearing. In order to 
make its case, H-Hook provides a description that is at best ambiguous and at worst a 
misstatement of the record: 
The P&Z Commission's published notice of its December hearing declared that a 
proposed development agreement would be added to the public record by November 17, 
2010, a week after the notice was published. That development agreement. .. was not 
actually included in the public record and made available for public review, until 
November 24, 2010, one day before the Thanksgiving holiday, two days before the cutoff 
date for written comment and just eight days before the public hearing. This failure to 
timely file the proposed development agreement made it essentially impossible for H-
Hook to comment on the most important document in the application. 
Appellant's Brief; at 12. The record actually shows that a draft development agreement was 
included with the Application when first filed on June 22, 2010 and was available for public 
review from that date. Ag. R. p. 3; 199-221. It was uploaded to the County website on 
November 8, 2010. Ag. R. p. 3518. A revised draft of the development agreement-containing 
only the County prosecutor's proposed revisions-was uploaded to the County website on 
November 24, 2010. Id. Thus, H-Hook and the Petitioners had nearly a week before the 
Commission hearing to review and consider the revised development agreement. 
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After the Commission hearing in December 20 l 0, the draft development agreement was 
again revised in light of the Commission's recommendation. This revision was released with the 
County's staff report eleven days prior to the June 6, 2011 Board hearing. Ag. R. p. 4028-80. 
The revisions to the Development Agreement were color-coded, showing changes made by the 
County Prosecutor (in red) made and included in the draft of the Development Agreement 
reviewed by the Commission. Ag. R. p. 4041. Changes requested directly by the Commission 
were noted in blue: changes requested as a result of a review by Bert Osborn (at the request of 
the Commission) were noted in purple; and other clean-up changes were noted in green. Id. 
Given this effort to provide the public with not only an updated draft eleven days prior to the 
hearing, but a draft that allowed the public to track the date and the source of those changes, it is 
clear H-Hook is not being forthright when it says it was "impossible ... to comment on the most 
important document in the application." Appellant's Brief, at 12. This claim is particularly 
suspect when the Agency Record shows that H-Hook, in fact, did provide comment. 
There was no violation in the County's procedure, which must be considered against the 
standard described in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of' Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 50 
P.3d 443 (2002). Notice is sufficient if it "give[s] members of the public notice of the types of 
issues and evidence that were likely to arise at the hearing and the types of evidence they may 
have wished to present to rebut" an applicant's claims. Evans, 137 Idaho at 432. Given the 
extent of its participation and the time it had to consider even the revised draft of the 
development agreement, it is clear that H-Hook had notice of the "types of issues and evidence 
that were likely to arise at the hearing." Id. 
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Rather than acknowledge this basic notice requirement as set forth Evans. H-Hook 
instead relies on Johnson v. City of Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 796 P.2d 162 (Ct.App. 1990) and 
Fischer v. City o{Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 (2005). However, the error in both 
those cases was the failure to include mandated element of an application. The Application 
element H-Hook complains was not available-the development agreement-was provided with 
AEHI's Application filing in June 2010 (Ag. R. p.3: 199-221) and was at all times available for 
public review. There was no missing component in this case. Johnson and Fischer do not apply. 
The question is whether the Evans standard was met. Without question, any member of 
the public-including H-Hook-had the ability to understand "the types of issues and evidence" 
in the development agreement that would be considered by the Board and the Commission. As 
shown above, H-Hook did, in fact, read the development and its principal provided testimony at 
the June 2011 hearing. June 6, 2011 Tr. p. 98-101. There was no due process violation. 
4. Given Its Extensive Participation in the Hearings Before the Commission and 
the Board, H-Hook Has Suffered No Substantial Injury Based on an Alleged 
Notice Defect 
There was no notice issue in this case. Even if there had been, no substantial right of H-
Hook has been prejudiced by the process followed in the County's hearings. 
Before its claim can have any traction with this Court, H-Hook must show prejudice to its 
substantial rights. LLUPA imposes this gatekeeping standard to ensure"[ o ]nly those whose 
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not the mere 
possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a decision." I.C. § 67-6535(3). 
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act repeats this requirement, stating "agency action shall be 
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affirmed unless substantial rights of appellant have been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279 
court "may therefore affirm a governing board's decision solely on the grounds that the 
petitioner has not shown prejudice to a substantial right." Hcnvkins, 151 Idaho at 232. 
A 
In reviewing the decisions of zoning boards, courts are to look at the proceedings as a 
whole and "evaluate the adequacy of procedures and the resultant decision in light of practical 
considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-
making." LC. § 67-6535(3). See also Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 [daho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 
487, 493 (2008). Fair-not perfect-is the applicable due process standard. Terrazas v. Blaine 
County ex rel. Bd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 193,203,207 P.3d 169, 179 (2009). "Only those whose 
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not the mere 
possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy .... " LC. § 67-6535(3). 
Whether an alleged notice error violates substantial rights is determined by considering 
whether a petitioner had the opportunity to participate in public hearings. See Cowan v. Board of 
Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006). That participation 
may be direct or through the petitioner's attorneys. Id. The Cowan case is particularly 
instructive on this point. In Cowan, the notices were actually (and admittedly) defective. This 
Court nevertheless held there was no violation of Cowan' s substantial rights: 
Here, the Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has 
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either defective notice. 
First, Cowan's counsel attended the July 30, 2001 hearing and submitted a brief objecting 
to the notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that hearing. Therefore, 
even if the notice were defective, Cowan has failed to demonstrate how this defect 
prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had notice of the meeting. 
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Coivan, 143 Idaho at 513. Similarly, in Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 
145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007), this Court concluded that "[a]lthough Neighbors 
did not present oral evidence at the first Board hearing, the meeting minutes indicate that. .. their 
attorney, presented a binder full of exhibits and a written objection, all of which were contained 
in the record and considered by the Board." Neighbors, 145 Idaho at 128. This led the Court to 
conclude that "Neighbors clearly had an adequate opportunity to be heard, and thus was not 
denied due process." Id. 
In light of H-Hook's and H-Hook's attorney's extensive participation before the 
Commission and the Board, it is clear that H-Hook suffered no such harm or violation of 
fundamental rights based upon any alleged failure of notice. Even if there had been a failure of 
notice, H-Hook submitted hundreds of pages of written comments and provided verbal testimony 
throughout. H-Hook's principal provided extensive comments on the development agreement 
itself during the June 2011 hearing. June 6, 2011 Tr. p. 98-101; Ag. R. p. 3911-3912. This belies 
any suggestion that H-Hook's participation was less than meaningful. There has been no 
violation of H-Hook's substantial rights based on a notice violation. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The County and AEHI respectfully request that this appeal be denied as: (1) the 
Comprehensive Plan is valid; (2) no illegal spot zoning occurred in this case; and (3) there was 
no notice violation and certainly no injury to a substantial right given H-Hook's extensive 
participation in the public hearings related to this matter. 
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